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Matter of Petition of Phillip A. C., 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 109 (Dec. 28, 2006) 1
FAMILY LAW – ADOPTION
Summary
Appeal from a district court order vacating the adoption of a minor child.
Disposition/Outcome
Reversed the district court order vacating the adoption and remanded the matter to the
district court.
Factual and Procedural History
Following a hearing, the district court granted Phillip A. C.’s petition for the adoption of
Z.R.K., the child of Phillip’s ex-stepdaughter, Tarah K. Although Tarah K. was not present at
the hearing, the petition for adoption was accompanied by two written consents terminating the
parental rights of Tarah K. and Z.R.K.’s father. Subsequently, Tarah sought the assistance of the
Central Council of Tlingit & Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska (Council) in an effort to overturn the
adoption. 2 Because Tarah is 7/16ths Native American and Z.R.K is 7/32nds Native American,
the Council filed a motion to intervene and vacate the adoption due to violations of the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Additionally, Tarah filed a petition to vacate the adoption. Both
parties were represented by Nevada Legal Services and were assigned the same district court
case number.
The district court did not rule on the Council’s motion to intervene, but found the
adoption invalid for failure to comply with the ICWA. Specifically, the district court found that
the adoption proceedings did not comply with 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a), which requires a judicial
certification asserting that the judge fully explained the voluntary consent for termination of
parental rights to both parents and that both fully understood the consequences of the consent.
Accordingly, the district court vacated Z.R.K.’s adoption conditioned on proof that Z.R.K. was a
Native American child.
In response, Nevada Legal Services submitted various documents on behalf of the
Council evidencing that Z.R.K. was eligible for membership of a Native American tribe. Phillip
filed an objection asserting that the documents did not comply with rules of evidence. Although
the district court found that the documents proving Z.R.K.’s membership eligibility did not meet
the affidavit requirements of NRCP 56(e), it granted the Council an additional thirty days to
submit proper affidavits. In the meantime, an unspecified “petitioner” filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal pursuant to NRCP 41(a); however, it was unclear whether Tarah or the Council had
filed it. Nevertheless, the Council submitted a proper affidavit of tribal enrollment officer,
Valerie M. Hillman, declaring Z.R.K.’s eligibility for membership. As such, the district court
entered an order to vacate the adoption because no judicial certification had been entered,
therefore violating the ICWA.
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Summarized by Erin Phillips
Tarah claimed she consented under duress and that Phillip prevented her from attending the adoption hearing.

Subsequently, Phillip appealed the order asserting that (1) the district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the Council’s motion to intervene and to vacate the adoption because the
Council and Tarah voluntarily dismissed the action; (2) the evidence submitted to prove that
Z.R.K. was a Native American child was inadequate; (3) the Council lacked independent
standing to contest the adoption; (4) the district court should have granted him the opportunity to
rebut the Council’s evidence.
Discussion
(1) District Court’s Jurisdiction to Vacate the Adoption
The court first considered Phillip’s claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the Council’s motion to intervene and to invalidate the adoption because the Council
and Tarah voluntarily dismissed the matter under NRCP 41(a). The court rejected this claim and
instead concluded that substantial evidence supported the Council’s assertion that only Tarah
was the dismissing petitioner. The court based its decision on two reasons. First, the dismissal
only referred to a single “petitioner,” which indicated that it was only applicable to one of the
parties. Also, both parties agreed that Tarah was the petitioner. Further, Tarah filed a “petition”
whereas the Council filed a “motion.” Second, the court noted that the Council’s vigorous
pursuit of its motion to intervene was wholly inconsistent with the filing of a voluntary dismissal.
Moreover, as an independent ground for its decision, the court reasoned that even if the
voluntary dismissal applied to both Tarah and the Council, it would be ineffectual because it was
filed at an advanced stage of the proceedings and the district court had already addressed the
merits of the case. 3 As such, the court concluded that the district court had proper jurisdiction to
permit the council’s intervention and vacate the adoption.
(2) Sufficiency of Evidence to Establish that Z.R.K. was a Native American Child
Next, the court addressed Phillip’s claim that the tribal officer’s affidavit was insufficient
to prove that the ICWA applied to Z.R.K.’s adoption. For the ICWA to apply, the child must be
under eighteen, unmarried and either (a) a member of a Native American tribe or (b) eligible for
such membership and the biological child of a tribe member. 4 The Native American tribe has
absolute discretion over membership determinations, 5 and that decision is not reviewable by an
appellate court. 6 Thus, the court’s role is to determine whether the individual asserting a child’s
membership eligibility on the tribe’s behalf has proper authority to do so.
3

NRCP 41(a), like the federal counterpart, is meant to prevent arbitrary dismissals in the advanced stages of
proceedings. The court explained that federal decisions interpreting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide
guidance when reviewing its own rules. Accordingly, the court analogized the case at hand to a federal case
interpreting FRCP 41(a), Harvey Aluminum v. American Cyanamid Co. 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1953). There, the
court of appeals interpreted FRCP 41(a)(1) to bar a plaintiff from dismissing an action through notice before the
defendant had answered because of the advanced point of the proceedings, during which the court had addressed the
merits of the case. Id. at 107-08. As such, the court concluded that the same interpretation should apply to NRCP
41(a). Thus, a voluntary dismissal by either Tarah or the Counsel would be ineffectual because it was filed three
months after the district court had heard the Council’s motion to intervene and made a decision to vacate the
adoption.
4
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2000).
5
In Interest of A.G.-G., 899 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
6
In re Dependency of A.L.W., 32 P.3d 297 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).

Phillip argued that the affidavit of the Council’s tribal enrollment officer, Valerie M.
Hillman, submitted to prove Z.R.K.’s membership eligibility did not comply with NRCP 56(e).
NRCP 56(e) requires that “[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” 7 Hillman’s affidavit stated
that she had served as the Council’s tribal enrollment officer for the past 15 years. Further,
Hillman attested to Tarah’s membership in the Tlingit & Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska and
Z.R.K’s eligibility in these tribes. Accordingly, the court found the affidavit sufficient to
establish Hillman’s authority to determine tribal membership eligibility and therefore admissible
to establish that Z.R.K. was a Native American child for purposes of the ICWA.
(3) The Council’s Standing to Challenge Z.R.K.’s Adoption
Assuming Z.R.K. was a Native American child under ICWA, Phillip asserted that the
Council had no independent standing to contest the adoption because the rights of the Council
dissolved when Z.R.K’s parents voluntarily relinquished their parental rights. The court rejected
this claim because it is inconsistent with provisions of the ICWA and presupposes that the parent
consent was valid despite the district court’s decision to the contrary. Pursuant to the ICWA, a
Native American tribe can intervene in any state court proceeding that terminates the parental
rights of child belonging to that tribe. 8 Because an adoption proceeding terminates parental
rights, the Council did have proper standing to challenge Z.R.K’s adoption in accordance with
the ICWA. Additionally, § 1914 of the ICWA provided standing to challenge the adoption
proceeding by allowing a Native American child’s tribe to file a petition to invalidate a
termination of parental rights upon a showing that certain ICWA provisions had been violated. 9
Even if the ICWA permitted tribe intervention or petition to challenge the termination of
parental rights, Phillip claimed that the same should not be true for an adoption action. He
asserted that because the tribe is not entitled to notice of the adoption, the two actions should not
be considered equivalent. His arguments were based primarily on the case of Navajo Nation v.
Superior Court of the State of Washington, 10 in which the Navajo Nation instituted an action in
federal court to invalidate the adoption of a Native American child seven years after the fact
because the parental consents were invalid. There, the court rejected the tribe’s claim that it was
entitled to notice of the voluntary adoption. 11 Thus, Phillip argued that if the tribe is not entitled
to notice, Congress did not intend to allow a tribe to contest the adoption. Therefore treating an

7

NEV. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (2000).
9
The statute provides that for termination of parental rights actions “[a]ny parent or custodian from whose
custody such child was removed, and the child’s tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to
invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of sections 1911, 1912, and
1913 of this title.” 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (2000). The court explained that a plausible argument could be made
that the use of “and” in the statute indicates that the parent or custodian and the child’s tribe must file a
petition to invalidate the termination of parental rights. However, the court chose to follow the Michigan
Court of Appeal’s decision in Matter of Kreft, which involved the parent petitioning independently of the
tribe. 384 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). There, the court concluded that Congress intended for
§ 1914 to give each party listed independent standing to challenge the validity of the action based on the
ICWA’s stated policy in 25 U.S.C. § 1902. See id.
10
47 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
11
Id. at 1238.
8

adoption as equivalent to termination of parental rights would undermine the ICWA’s adoption
provisions.
Additionally, Phillip contended that Navajo Nation established the rule that only the
natural parents of a Native American child are authorized to institute an action to invalidate their
adoption and that these actions are subject to time restrictions. However, the court rejected
Navajo Nation’s applicability on three grounds. First, Navajo Nation relied on a parens patriae
theory to assert standing for claims of all tribal members. 12 In contrast, the Council claimed
independent standing pursuant to ICWA § 1914, which the court already found applicable.
Second, the court in Navajo Nation found the parental consents valid 13 whereas the district court
in the Z.R.K. adoption found the consents invalid in violation of 1913(a), therefore providing the
Council standing pursuant to ICWA § 1914. Lastly, the time gap in the present case was
insignificant as compared to the seven year gap in Navajo Nation. Given these distinctions, the
court held that ICWA § 1913(a) provided the Council with proper standing to challenge the
parental consents in the Z.R.K. adoption.
(4) District Court’s Failure to Provide an Opportunity to Rebut the Council’s Affidavit
Despite its decision to permit Hillman’s affidavit to serve as admissible evidence
establishing Z.R.K.’s status as a Native American, the court concluded that Phillip should have
been given the opportunity to challenge the affidavit. Accordingly, the court remanded the
matter so that Phillip could submit evidence to rebut Hillman’s authority to make membership
determinations for the Council. However, the remand was limited to this issue and the court
order to vacate the adoption will stand if Phillip cannot rebut Hillman’s authorization.
Conclusion
The court reached five conclusions regarding Phillip’s appeal of the district court order
vacating his adoption of Z.R.K. First, substantial evidence supports the Council’s assertion that
only Tarah dismissed her petition and therefore the district court had jurisdiction to consider the
Council’s motion to intervene and invalidate Phillip’s adoption of Z.R.K. Second, the voluntary
dismissal was filed after the district court addressed the merits of the case and therefore
ineffective. Third, Hillman’s affidavit was admissible evidence for the purpose of establishing
Z.R.K.’s status as a Native American. Fourth, a Native American tribe has independent standing
to contest a voluntary adoption under the ICWA because it includes a termination of parental
rights. Fifth, the district court erred by not allowing Phillip to submit evidence rebutting
Hillman’s affidavit. Therefore, the court reversed the district court order and remanded the case.
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Id. at 1241.
Id. at 1241-42.

